

INFERENCE ATTACK PREVENTION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION ON SOCIAL NETWORKS

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ABSTRACT

Online social networks, such as Facebook, LinkedIn are increasingly use by many people. These networks allow users to give details about themselves and allow connecting to their friends. Some of the information visible inside these networks is meant to be private. It is possible to use learning algorithms on released data to predict private information. We explore how to launch inference attacks using released social networking data to predict private information. We devise three possible sanitization techniques that could be used in various situations. Then, we define the effectiveness of these techniques and attempt to use methods of collective inference to discover sensitive attributes of the data set. We also show that we can decrease the effectiveness of both local and relational classification algorithms by using the sanitization methods we described.

KEYWORDS : Social Network Analysis, Data Mining, Social Network Privacy, Genetic Algorithm

Social networks are online applications that allow their users to connect by means of various link types. These networks allow people to list details about themselves that are relevant to the nature of the network. In general-use social network individual users list their favorite activities, books, and movies. LinkedIn is a professional network; because of this users will specify details which are related to their professional life (i.e., reference letters, previous employment, and so on.) Because these sites gather extensive personal information of users, social network application providers have a rare opportunity: direct use of this information could be useful to advertisers for direct marketing. In practice, privacy concerns can prevent these efforts. This conflict between the desired use of data and individual privacy presents an opportunity for privacy preserving social network data mining that is the discovery of information and relationships from social network data without violating privacy. Privacy concerns of individuals in a social network can be classified into two categories privacy after data release and private information leakage. The Instances of privacy after data release involve the identification of specific individuals in a data set subsequent to its release to the general public or to paying customers for a specific usage. Private information leakage is related to details about an individual that are not explicitly stated, but, they are inferred through other details released and

relationships to individuals who may express that detail. An example of this type of information leakage is a scenario where a user, says Arnold, does not enter his political affiliation because of privacy concerns. But, it is publicly available that he is a member of the “legalize the same sex marriage.” By using these type of available information publicly available regarding a general Group membership, it is easily guessable what Arnold's political affiliation is somewhat less obvious is the favorite movie “The End of the Spear” We note that this is an issue which is related to both in live data and in any released data.

LITERATURE SURVEY

Traditional He et al., 2006 Consider ways to infer private information via friendship links by creating a Bayesian network from the links inside a social network. While they will crawl a real social network, they use hypothetical attributes to analyze their learning algorithm, but they have not considered collective inference techniques for possible inference attack (He et al., 2006).

Zheleva and Getoor propose several methods of Social graph anonymization and focusing mainly on the idea that by anonymizing both the nodes in the group and the link structure, that one thereby anonymizes the graph (Zheleva and Getoor, 2008).

Gross et al., 2005 examine specific usage instances at Carnegie Mellon. They note potential attacks, such as Node re identification, that easily accessible data on Facebook could assist. They further

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note that while privacy controls may exist on the user's end of the social networking site but many individuals do not take advantage of this tool. This finding coincides well with the amount of data that we were able to crawl using a very simple crawler on a Facebook network. We will extend on their work by experimentally examining the accuracy of some types of the demographic re identification that they propose before and after sanitization (Gross et al., 2005).

Jones and Soltren crawl Facebook's data and analyze usage trends among Facebook users will employing both profile postings and survey information. Their paper focuses mostly on faults inside the Facebook platform. They do not discuss attempting to learn unrevealed details of Facebook users and do no analysis of the details of Facebook users. Their crawl consist of around 70,000 Facebook accounts (Jones and Soltren, 2005).

Sen and Getoor was compare various methods of link-based classification including loopy belief propagation, mean field relaxation labeling, and iterative classification (Sen and Getoor, 2007).

Tasker et al. present an alternative classification method where they build on Markov networks. None of these papers consider ways to combat their classification methods (Tasker 2002).

Zheleva and Getoor attempt to predict the private attributes of users in four real-world data sets Facebook, Flickr, Dogster and BibSonomy. They do not attempt to actually anonymized or sanitize any graph data. but their focus is on how specific types of data namely that of declared and inferred group membership, may be used as a way to boost the local and relational classification accuracy. Their define method of group based (as opposed to details-based or link-based) classification is an inherent part of our details-based classification, as we will treat the group membership data as another detail, as we do favorite books or movies (Zheleva and Getoor, 2008).

Talukder et al. propose a method of measuring the amount of information that a user reveals to the outside world and which automatically Determines which

information (on a per-user basis) should be removed to increase the privacy of an individual (Talukder et al., 2010).

We do preliminary work on the effectiveness of our Links, details and Average classifiers and examine their effectiveness after removing some details from the graph. We try to expand further by evaluating their effectiveness after removing details. (Lindamood and Heatherly., 2009).

1. Naïve Bayesian Classification

Determining an individual's political affiliation is an exercise in graph classification. Given a node n_i with m details and p potential classification labels, C_1, \dots, C_p , the probability of n_i being in class C_x , is given by the equation given below, where $\arg \max_{1 \leq x \leq p}$ represents the possible class label that maximizes the previous equation. This is difficult to calculate, P for any given value of x is unknown. Then by applying Bayes' theorem, we have equation

$$\operatorname{argmax}_{1 \leq x \leq p} \left[\frac{P(C_x^i) \times P(D_1^1 \dots \dots \dots D_1^m | C_x^i)}{P(D_1^1 \dots \dots \dots D_1^m)} \right] \quad (1)$$

Further, by assuming that all details are independent, we are left with the simplified equation [1].

$$\operatorname{argmax}_{1 \leq x \leq p} \left[\frac{P(C_x^i) \times P(D_1^1 | C_x^i) \times \dots \dots \dots \times P(D_1^m | C_x^i)}{P(D_1^1 \dots \dots \dots D_1^m)} \right] \quad (2)$$

2. Naive Bayes on Friendship Links

Consider the problem of determining the class detail value of person n_i given their friendship links using a naive Bayes model. That is, of calculating $P(C_i | N_i)$. Because there are relatively few people in the training set that have a friendship link to n_i , the calculations for $P(C_i | N_i)$ become extremely inaccurate. Instead, we choose to decompose this relationship. Rather than having a link from person n_i to n_j , we instead consider the probability of having a link from n_i to someone with n_j 's details. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} P(C_x^i | F_{i,j}) &\approx \frac{P(C_x^i | L_1, L_2 \dots \dots \dots L_m)}{P(C_x^i) \times P(L_1 | C_x^i) \times \dots \dots \dots P(L_m | C_x^i)} \\ &\approx \frac{P(C_x^i | F_{i,j})}{P(L_1, L_2 \dots \dots \dots L_m)} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Where L_n represents a link to someone with detail $J_n[1]$.

3. Weighing Friendships

There is one last step to calculating $P(C_i | N_i)$. In the specific case of social networks, two friends can be anything from acquaintances to close friends or family members. While there are many ways to weigh friendship links, the method we used is very easy to calculate and is based on the assumption that the more public details two people share, the more private details they are likely to share. This gives the following formula for $W_{i,j}$, which represents the weight of a friendship link from n_i to node n_j :

$$W_{i,j} = \frac{|(D_i^1 \dots D_i^n) \cap (D_j^1 \dots D_j^m)|}{|D_i|} \quad (4)$$

Equation (5) calculates the total number of details n_i and n_j share divided by the number of details of n_i . Note that the weight of a friendship link is not the same for both people on each side of a friendship link. In other words, $W_{j,i} \neq W_{i,j}$. The final formula for person i becomes the following, where Z represents a normalization factor and $P(C_i | F_{i,j})$ is calculated by

$$p(C_i | N_i) = \frac{1}{Z} \sum_{n_j \in N_i} [P(C_i | F_{i,j}) \times W_{i,j}] \quad (5)$$

The value $p(C_i | N_i)$ is used as our approximation to $P(C_i | N_i)$.

IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

A. Platform: Microsoft .Net

Microsoft .Net provides first class comprehensive support for the newest c# technologies and latest .

B. Genetic Algorithm

In a genetic algorithm approach, a solution (i.e., a point in the search space) is called a “chromosome” or string. A GA approach requires a population of Chromosomes (strings) representing a combination of features from the solution set, and requires a cost function (called an evaluation or fitness function). This function calculates the fitness of each chromosome. The algorithm manipulates a finite set of chromosomes (the

population), based loosely on the mechanism of evolution. In each generation, chromosomes are subjected to certain operators, such as crossover, inversion and mutation, which are analogous to processes which occur in natural reproduction. Crossover of two chromosomes produces a pair of offspring chromosomes which are synthesis of the traits of their parents. Inversion in a chromosome produces a mirror-image reflection of a subset of the features on the chromosome. Mutation of a Chromosome produces a nearly identical chromosome with only local alternations of some regions of the chromosome. By using Genetic Algorithm we will increase the accuracy and set privileges for friends, family friends and business friends to access the private information publish in social network.

Algorithm

1. Start
2. Consider a graph having nodes and edges of datasets.
3. Select individual nodes.
4. Perform crossover i.e. find probability values of details, links and weights.
5. Store probability values in fitness function.
6. According to probability values set privileges.
7. Stop.


Module Architecture

1. Learning method of social network module

- Input: In this module we consider the graph nodes in the datasets as input, in which nodes represent the details, link represent the friendship link.
- Algorithm: Genetic algorithm
- Output: Probability values of the attributes which we want to protect from inference attack.

2. Network Classification module

- Input: Probability values as calculated in first module
- Algorithm: Local Classifier, Relational Classifier, collective inference method.
- Output: According to probability values we remove details, link or both in order to protect private information.



3. Private Information Hiding Module

In this module we set the privileges for friends, business friends and family friends so that the private information is hide and protected.

RESULTS

WebKB: This data is based on the WebKB Project. It consists of sets of web pages from four computer science departments, with each page manually




Figure 1 : 0 Details 0 Links Removed (Existing System)






Figure 2 : 0 Details 0 Links Removed (Proposed System)



labeled into 7 categories: course, department, faculty, project, staff, student, or other. We do not include the 'other' pages in the Graph, but use them to generate edges. This data file contains eight different graphs (two per university). For each university, we have the graph using direct hyperlinks and another graph using co-citation links. To create co-citation edges, we do allow an 'other' page as an intermediary although the final graph does not include the 'other' pages. To weight the link between x and y, we sum the number of hyperlinks from x to z and separately the number from y to z, and multiply these two quantities. These attributes we have

consider as an input in module I. We can use the datasets IMDB, CORA and SEC filings. CORA: This data set is based on the cora data set, which comprises computer science research papers. It includes the full citation graph as well as labels for the topic of each paper. There are seven possible labels. The file contains two data sets, one using only citation links and one using both citation and shared-author links. The edge weights are added: one per shared author and one for a citation (two if the papers cite each other).

In dataset there are various fields like user id, user name, movie, book name, interest, political affiliation,

Graph 1: 0 Details, 0 Links Removed

Sr. No.	Average	20		40		60		80	
		Ex.	Pr.	Ex.	Pr.	Ex.	Pr.	Ex.	Pr.
1	Average	0.8	0.83	0.79	0.82	0.79	0.82	0.79	0.82
	Diff. Bt E&P	0.3		0.3		0.3		0.3	
2	Details	0.8	0.83		0.82	0.79	0.82	0.79	0.82
	Diff. Bt E&P	0.3		0.3		0.3		0.3	
3	Links	0.7	0.75	0.73	0.78	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.79
	Diff. Bt E&P	0.5		0.5		0.5		0.5	
4	SVM	0.75	0.81	0.75	0.8	0.75	0.8	0.8	0.83
	Diff. Bt E&P	0.6		0.5		0.5		0.3	

Table 1 & 2 : Shows the Accuracy of Existing and Proposed System for Political Affiliation (Consevative and Liberal)

Graph 2: 0 Details, 10 Links Removed

Sr. No.	Average	20		40		60		80	
		Ex.	Pr.	Ex.	Pr.	Ex.	Pr.	Ex.	Pr.
1	Average	0.8	0.83	0.8	0.83	0.8	0.83	0.8	0.83
	Diff. Bt E&P	0.3		0.3		0.3		0.3	
2	Details	0.81	0.84	0.81	0.84	0.81	0.84	0.81	0.84
	Diff. Bt E&P	0.3		0.3		0.3		0.3	
3	Links	0.61	0.64	0.61	0.64	0.62	0.65	0.62	0.65
	Diff. Bt E&P	0.3		0.3		0.3		0.3	
4	SVM	0.75	0.78	0.72	0.75	0.75	0.78	0.75	0.78
	Diff. Bt E&P	0.3		0.3		0.3		0.3	

sexual orientation etc out of which we consider two fields political affiliation and sexual orientation which we want to

show that by removing only details, and then we greatly reduce the accuracy of local classifiers, it will give us the maximum accuracy that we were able to achieve through any combination of classifiers. In future work we will identify the key node of the graph if it will remove or alter due to this node we can decrease and provide information leakage and give limited access to private information we want to protect.

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